A novel control technique, termed control redistribution, is presented and applied in conjunction with Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation (MMAE) to the Variable In-flight Stability Test Aircraft (VISTA) F-16, to detect and compensate for sensor and/or actuator failures. This ad hoc method redistributes control commands (that would normally be sent to failed actuators) to the non-failed actuators, accomplishing the same control action on the aircraft. Dither is considered to help disambiguate failures in the longitudinal and lateral-directional channels. Detection of both single-actuator and single-sensor failures is considered. Failures are demonstrated detectabke in less than one second, with an aircraft output nearly identical to that anticipated from a fully functional aircraft in the same environment.
INTRODUCTION
Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation (MMAE) and Control (MMAC) algorithms have proven successful at isolating and declaring sensor and actuator failures [3, 11, 12, 141. If employed as part of an aircraft's flight control system, these techniques may potentially enhance mission effectiveness by allowing crippled aircraft to maintain handling qualities so that they can continue the mission, return to base for repairs, or, as a minimum, provide a stable platform for safe egress of the aircrew. These methods may also eliminate the need for some of the redundant components currently in use. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT/ENG) has been working with Wright Laboratory (WL/FIGS) to develop multiple model, MMAE-based algorithms for flight control applications [3, 4, 11, 12, 14, 191. This paper continues that effort by introducing control redistribution and merging it into the framework of an MMAE-based controller.
MMAE AND MMAE-BASED CONTROL
Let U denote the vector of uncertain parameters in a given linear stochastic model for a dynamic system, in this case depicting the failure status of sensors and actuators of the aircraft. These parameters can affect the matrices defining the structure of the model or depicting the statistics of the noises entering it. In order to make simultaneous estimation of states and parameters tractable, it is assumed that a can take on only one of li discrete representative values (in this application corresponding to a fully functional aircraft, or any one totally failed sensor, or any one totally failed actuator). If we define the hypothesis conditional probability p k ( i r ) as the probability that a assumes the value u k (for k=1,2,. . . , K ) , conditioned on the observed measurement history to time t,: p k ( f r ) = Pr[a = ak(Z(t,) = Z,]
(1) then it can be shown [l, 5, 8, 
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E,=, fz( t , ) l a , z ( t , -l )(z% la, t Z%-I)Y~ ( t a -1 ) P k ( t t ) = I< in terms of the previous values of p1(tl-1), . . . , p~< ( t , -.~) , and conditional probability densities for the current measurement z ( t , ) to be defined explicitly in Equation (11). Notationally, the measurement history random vector 2(tr) is made up of partitions z(t1), . . . , z ( t i ) that are the measurements available at the sample times t l , . . . , t i ; similarly, the realization 2, of the measurement history vector has partitions z1, . . . , z;. More explicitly, let the model corresponding to ak be described by an "equivalent" discrete-time model [lo, 9, 121 for a continuous-time system with sampled data measurements:
where x is the state vector, U is a control input vector, wdk(t,)
is discrete-time zero-mean white Gaussian dynamics noise of covariance &dk at each t,, z is the measurement vector, and v k ( t , ) is discrete-time zero-mean white Gaussian measurement noise of covariance Rk at t , , assumed independent of W d k ; the initial state x(to) is modeled as Gaussian, with mean j i k o and covariance P~o and is assumed independent of Wdk and vk.
Based on this model, the Kalman filter [12] is specified by the measurement update:
Kk(tr) = Pk(L-)H;A,'(t,)
2k(ti+) = 2 k ( t a -) + Kk(tt) [z, -H&(tl-) -Dku(t1)] (7) and the propagation relation:
When the measurement z, becomes available at time t,, the residual vector rk is generated in each of the h ' filters according to the bracketed term in Equation (7), and used to compute p l (t,), . . . , p~( t , ) via Equation (2). Each numerator density function in Equation (2) is given by the Gaussian form:
f.(*,)l.,e(t,-i)(Zllak,Zl-l) = *~k(~,)~[-~'k('a)TAk-l(ta)rk(ta)l P k ( t * ) = 1 P-IY I A k ( t . ) l + (11) where m is the measurement dimension and Ah(&) is calculated in the kth Kalman filter as in Equation (5). The denominator in Equation (2) is simply the sum of all the computed numerator terms and thus is the scale factor required to ensure that the pk(t,) d u e s sum to one.
In practice the pk (t,)s are artificially lower bounded (Pkmm = 0.001) to prevent "lock-out" (if any pk is ever computed to be zero, the Equation (2) iteration will lock the probabilities to zero for d l time thereafter), and the scalar P k coefficient preceding the exponential in Equation (11) is stripped to prevent a tendency to generate false alarms about sensor failures [2, 3, 7, 13, 14, 121.
One expects the residuals of the Kalman filter based upon the "best" model to have a mean squared value most in consonance with its own computed &(&) consistently over time, while "mismatched" filters will have larger residuals than anticipated through &(&). Therefore Equations (2), (3), and (5)-(11) will most heavily weight the filter based upon the most correct assumed parameter value. However, the performance of the algorithm depends on there being significant differences in the characteristics of residuals in "correct" versus mismatched filters. Each filter should be tuned for best performance when the "true" values of the uncertain parameters are identical to its assumed values for these parameters. One should specifically avoid the "conservative" philosophy of adding considerable dynamics pseudo-noise, often used to guard against divergence, since this tends to mask the differences between good and bad models. If, as a result of such tuning, one of the filters should diverge (which is clearly indicated by large magnitude residuals or a large P k (tl) as computed in Equation (In)), it can be restarted with the current state estimate from the MMAE as computed from the non-divergent filters.
CONTROL REDISTRIBUTION
There are several ways to provide control within a multiple model framework. One method is to use MMAE-based control, which is constructed by sending a probability-weighted state estimate in the form of Equation (3) to a single robust controller. Similarly, the single controller may not require fullstate feedback, but instead rely on a set of measurements (possibly just a subset of the states), estimates of which can be cdculated from the state estimates by
) Additionally, the MMAEbased controller can also directly provide parameter estimates, A, as a probability-weighted average analogous to Equation (3), to be used in the calculation or scheduling of the controller in addition to the state or measurement estimates. This form of MMAEbased control, shown in Figure 2 , has the advantage that the controller is explicitly made aware of changes in parameters and can adapt accordingly, and this form will be used in this research. In this figure, U is provided as the input to the real-world system (and also to the Kalman filters' propagation equations), which then produces the measurements z.
In contrast to MMAE-based control, a multiple model adaptive controller (MMAC) would remove the single "con- As an alternative to replacing or modifying the existing, tested, and well-performing Block 40 flight control system, the method of control redistribution carries over the existing Block 40 flight control system with no internal modifications. As depicted in Figure 3 , the only enhancements are an MMAE frontend which provides state and parameter estimates, and control redistribution logic which, based on the parameter estimate from the MMAE, reroutes commands intended for a failed actuator to other functional actuators that can, in combination, have the same effect on the aircraft as the actuator that is no longer available due to failure. If the estimated parameter corresponds to either a fully functional aircraft or sensor failures, then the control signals are simply passed through, and the effective system is identical to a simple MMAE-based controller using only the Block 40 controller with no control redistribution. Note that in Figure 3 the redistributed control, U,, is sent to the real-world system, which produces measurements, z; r is a pilot command.
The basic premise of control redistribution is that sufficient redundancy is inherent in the existing aircraft control surfaces so that commands intended for a failed control surface can be redistributed to the remaining functional control surfaces with virtually no noticeable change in performance. Although control redistribution cannot completely compensate for the loss of an actuator (the total amount of control authority available to any flight control system is decreased an amount commensurate with the control authority possessed by the individual actuator before it failed), for small to moderate commands, the drop in performance is found to be negligible.
Mathematically, the desired redistribution relationship (redistributed control applied to the failed system is equivalent to the originally commanded control applied to the fully functional system) can be expressed as Bf,,iu, % Bu (13) where Bf.i, represents the input matrix corresponding to a failed actuator condition and U? represents the redistributed control signals. The need for an approximate relationship (versus a true equality) will become apparent later, though physically one might expect that the use of redistributed control will not have exactly the same contribution to the dynamics as using the original control (unless the actuators in question truly are redundant components). The failed input matrix has one or more columns scaled by a constant, 0 5 e 5 1. For a failure of the ith actuator, this matrix can be expressed as where Fa; is an identity matrix (of dimensionality equal to that of U) except that its ith diagonal element is e instead of one. As in the MMAE, the redistribution matrix will be constructed using completely failed assumptions, e = 0.
Assuming a linear transformation for the redistribution matrix, the redistribution control input becomes: (14) and (15) into Equation (13) Because the solution must be true for a general control input, U is removed from both sides of Equation (16), leaving:
The temptation to remove B from both sides must be avoided since no solution for D exists for the expression F,;D,; = I when a complete failure is hypothesized. The problem is that, when Fa; is rank deficient (recall that failed actuators are indicated by columns of zeroes) , a pseudoinverse is needed to find a solution, and, whereas for a true inverse the equality, where the pseudoinverse is denoted by the superscript +. The need for the approximation back in Equation (13) is now clear: while the pseudoinverse will give a true inverse where possible, in the direction corresponding to the deficient column, the pseudoinverse gives only an approximate solution. The pseudoinverse does, however, give the best solution in the least squares sense, i. e. the error, 11 BF,iD,; -B I( is minimized [18] .
At this point, an analysis of the redistribution matrix, D,;
, is warranted. D,i has the form of an identity matrix except that the ith column has been replaced by a column which redistributes the ith control input to the remaining inputs. This property can be shown by simple manipulation of Equation (18) : (18) x (BF,;)+B -F,; + F,; (20) x (BF,;)+B -(BF,,;)+(BF,;) + Fa; (21)
x (BF,,)+B(I -Fa;) + Fa;
(22) The second term of Equation (22) creates a diagonal matrix with ones in the diagonal entry of every column corresponding to a functional actuator. The first term, on the other hand, pulls off the failed columns of (BF,;)+B and adds them to the this diagonal matrix to create D,;. As an example, consider the redistribution matrix corresponding to an assumed failed left stabilator (actuator number one, or i = l), given for this Equation (23) [20] . The SRF provides a full six-degree-of-freedom simulation using nonlinear equations of motion, and it incorporates features such as advanced actuator modeling, the complete Block 40 controller of the actual aircraft, and the Aileron Rudder Interconnect, used for turn coordination. The availability of a high order truth model is a significant improvement in depicting actual performance of failure detection and control via MMAE/MMAC, since earlier attempts at failure detection were either verified using only linear dynamics [6] or else they modeled only the longitudinal channel [ll, 121 , and therefore their results were not necessarily indicative of the response of a real aircraft. The necessary measurements for the control system are angle-of-attack, pitch, roll, and yaw rates, and normal and lateral accelerations (as felt at the pilot's station). The dynamics noise model used is that derived by Pogoda [16] from the Dryden wind model specified in MIL-STD-1797A [15] , and the sensor noise is based on conservative estimates since real F-16 data was unavailable [17] .
The VISTA F-16 has four sets of control surfaces: leading edge flaps, flaperons, stabilators, and a rudder. Flaperons span much of the trailing edge of the wings and can be commanded differentially as ailerons to produce rolling moments, symmetrically as flaps to produce pitching moments, or as a blending of the two commands. Stabilators compose the horizontal tail, and they can also be commanded in the same manner as with the flaperons. A single vertical tail with a rudder on the trailing edge is used to produce yawing moments and coordination, Note the inherent redundancy between the flaperons and stabilators -this property will be exploited by the control redistribution scheme.
Dither, defined as the purposeful introduction of excitation into the system, is required for the MMAE to be able to detect and disambiguate the failures in this application when no vehicle maneuvering is being commanded. 
Probability Plots as P e r f o r m a n c e Indicators
The most vital aspect of any multiple model structure is the ability to provide accurate state estimates and to determine the best parameter estimate quickly. These abilities are rooted in the tuning of the Kalman filters. Therefore the first task is to ensure that the Kalman filters, and the resulting M M A E based controller, are properly tuned. In the context of this research, a well-tuned MMAE is one which detects all failures as quickly as possible without introducing false alarms. This criterion is perhaps best evaluated through the use of probability plots. Recall that each filter and its associated failure hypothesis gets assigned a probability, pk (t;), between zero and one, and a probability greater than 0.95 could be used to trigger a failure declaration. This declaration can result in a bank swap of elemental filters to be actively maintained within a hierarchical structure developed previously [3, 121 for multiple failures, and it also is used for the decision on how to redistribute control for the MMAE-based control redistribution technique. By simultaneously viewing the probabilities associated with each filter, one can quickly determine the declared failure status of the MMAE. Additionally, viewing the values of the probabilities when a n incorrect declaration is made in preliminary performance evaluations gives insights as to how to tune the system for better performance.
The probability plot corresponding to the completely tuned MMAE is shown in Figure 4 , which was produced from ten Monte Carlo runs of the truth model for each of the twelve possible failure modes. The probability plot shows twelve plots of probabilities versus time, corresponding to the twelve filters (and their associated hypotheses) in the filter bank. The y-axis label of each plot identifies the hypothesized failure condition for that particular filter, with the nomenclature defined according to Table 2 Figure 4 represents a separate set of ten Monte Carlo runs, hypothesizing only the failure indicated by the y-axis label, i.e., only the filter correctly hypothesizing the failed component is given. is employed by imposing limits on the control inputs. Note that the VISTA F-16 with this LQG/PI controller does not meet handling qualities (and is not even a satisfactory closed-loop controlled system). The intent of these simulations is only to verify the ability of control redistribution to match trajectories (regardless of controller), and the results are not necessarily indicative of desired performance. As expected, the use of control redistribution on the linear simulation allowed the failed aircraft to follow virtually the exact same trajectory as the aircraft without failures when presented with input test doublets. So flawless was the performance using control redistribution, in fact, that rather than present the reader with repetitive figures, a composite test signal was created which exercised control authority in all three channels simultaneously. This composite test signal serves two purposes. First it poses a more challenging test signal (even inducing saturations due to the rate and position limits), and second, it reduces the number of plots presented, while still conveying the same amount of information. The composite signal is set up as an overlapping sequence of three pulses, each three seconds in duration with amplitude given in T& ble 3. The entire sequence of pulses begins one second after the simulation begins. Also, to avoid saturating the rudder on the fully functional aircraft used for comparison, the p input is reduced to ' -n degrees. Graphically the form of the input signal is given in Figure 5 . Figure 6 shows the results of the linear simulations. Note that, for each of these figures, the first column is the set of longitudinal variables, the second column shows the set of lateral/directional variables, and the last column displays the control variables. Also, although not easily seen on most plots, each of these graphs really do contain two plots -a solid line corresponding to the response of the aircraft using control redistribution and a dotted line corresponding to the response of the fully functional aircraft without control redistribution. The control redistribution method proves to provide nearly identical performance with respect to the system states and outputs.
Linearized System Veriflcation of Control Redist r i b u t i o n
Only on the actuator plots, where a difference is expected, can the two responses be easily distinguished.
Note that the flaperons and stabilators occur in pairs. While these sets are not truly redundant pairs, they do have some redundant properties that make i t easier to cope with recovery from a stabilator or flaperon failure than recovery from a rudder failure. For example, in Figure 6 , the magnitude of the remaining functional surfaces increases to reflect the additional control authority passed to them by the redistribution matrix, but the resultant positions are still reasonable. This behavior is in contrast to the case where a rudder failure causes However, because the controller is not attempting to drive the actuator hard into saturation, the state trajectory is still very close to that of the functional aircraft. The effects of position limiting on control redistribution can be enhanced by increasing the magnitude of the yaw doublet to 30 degrees. Figure 7 shows the resulting trajectories for the case of a failed rudder, where the redistributed controller is not able to follow the trajectory due to position limiting. Rate limiting is also a concern, but due to the linear model not effectively implementing rate limiting, the effect cannot be investigated here. Note that the fifth column of D, in Equation (24), corresponding to the redistribution of the rudder, contains the largest magnitudes, representing the largest redistributed commands being sent to each of the remaining actuators. An aircraft with multiple rudders (vertical tails), such as the F-15 or F-22, would alleviate this problem and increase the range for redistributed control (before hitting saturations).
M M A E -B a s e d Control Redistribution
The evaluation of MMAEBased Control Redistribution is made using the nonlinear VISTA SRF simulation and incorporating the Block 40 FCS as the controller. The length of each simulation is set to be eight seconds, with a failure introduced one second after the start of the simulation. The test doublets are then introduced one second later. Note that a composite test signal such as that used for the linear simulation was not possible on the nonlinear simulation without either leaving the self-imposed linear region around the nominal operating condition, or else making the doublet amplitudes so small as to be uninteresting. Therefore, three separate test doublets, described in Table 3 , are used here. Although the requirement to stay within the linear region of the MMAE may seem overly restrictive, reference [17] presents methods of implementation which would allow the operation of an MMAEbased controller to overcome this restriction.
Two sets of ten Monte Carlo runs are generated for each failure condition, and the results plotted together for comparison. The first set is made with the reference, fully functional aircraft and is used as a basis of comparison to evaluate the effectiveness of control redistribution. The mean (dashed line) and f one standard deviation (dash-dotted line) are plotted.
As the baseline, these same three lines will appear in each figure, though the standard deviation is so small that they may appear to the reader as one single line (the stochastic effects of the wind and noise are negligible compared to the magnitudes of the dither and test doublets). The second set incorporates MMAE-based control redistribution and implements the failure condition noted on the plot. Again, the mean (solid line) and f one standard deviation (dotted line) are plotted, and in most cases these three lines will also appear as one solid line. f i r t h e r , if the MMAEbased control redistribution method worked perfectly, then the two sets of meanfone standard deviations would overlap. However, an identical response is not anticipated due to the mismatch between the nonlinear model, incorporated in the VISTA SRF, and the linear design model.
Note that only flight conditions in which an actuator failure is experienced are considered, since sensor failures are not corrected by control redistribution. Sensor failures are compensated within the MMAE itself through the blending of the state estimates. Reference [2] provides an analysis of an M M A E based controller's response to sensor failures. Figures 8-10 show typical comparisons between the (baseline) fully functional aircraft controlled with an MMAE-based Block 40 FCS and the aircraft experiencing an actuator failure controlled by MMAEbased control redistribution. Note that the same set of baseline meanfone standard deviation trajectory traces do appear in each figure, though they may seem different due to changes in scaling of the axis.
For stabilator and flaperon failures, the longitudinal states are able to track very well. There is a slight, steadily increasing, separation between the pitch angles, which results in an increasing flight path angle and therefore also appears as a slow separation in the velocity trajectory. Angle of attack and pitch rate are very closely matched by the redistributed control. Normal acceleration tracks with a slight offset bias. This positive bias may very well be the cause behind the slow changes indicated by the velocity and pitch angle. In the lateral/directional channel, the roll rate and lateral acceleration are seen to track very closely. A slight separation appears in the yaw rate, as well as the sideslip and roll angles. Noting the scale on the graphs, the difference in sideslip angle can be dismissed as insignificant. Even the roll angle, which grows to a separation of approximately five degrees, and shows the worst separation of any variable, is of relatively little consequence since the pi- Figure 3 . It uses an MMAE front-end to generate optimally reconstructed measurements to replace raw sensor data as an input to the flight control system, thereby addressing sensor failures. Then the MMAE's parameter estimate (detected failure status) is used by the control redistribution logic back-end to reroute commands initially intended for a failed actuator to other functional actuators that together can have the same effect on the aircraft as the now-failed actuator.
S U M M A R Y The algorithm developed in this research is shown in
The MMAE-based control redistribution has shown excellent results and yields a design which, because i t augments instead of replaces the existing flight control system, is easily implemented for flight testing. The MMAE front-end is capa- Although partial failures and multiple failures remain to be tested using a full implementation of MMAE-based control redistribution, Eide [2, 31 did investigate the ability of the MMAE to detect (but not control) partial and multiple failures. Since an MMAE can completely compensate for sensor failures, what remains to be considered is the ability of control redistribution to account for partial and multiple actuator failures. These failure conditions are currently being explored, as are better models of failures (not simply multiplying a column of B or row of H by e), better dithers (particularly after declared actuator failures), gain scheduling, and a thorough study of saturation effects on algorithm performance.
